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I INTRODUCTION
In specialized mixed-use and larger-scale sectional title schemes consisting of
more than one building, there is an increasing need to be able to separate the
various components of the scheme according to use and/or location and to
administer certain aspects of each component separately. In a scheme that
comprises mixed uses, such as a commercial component and a residential
component in one or more buildings, there is, for instance, no reason why all
the members of the scheme should be responsible for the maintenance of and
repairs to those lifts, internal staircases and basements which serve only a
particular component. However, body corporate costs for maintenance of
and repairs to parts of the scheme are paid from the common fund to which
all sectional owners have to contribute in proportion to their quotas,1
without taking account of the use made by a particular owner or group of
owners of the particular facility. Thus, if the lift serving only the residential
owners on the higher ﬂoors of a mixed-use building needs repair, the body
corporate has to pay for the repair out of the levies collected from all the
owners. Similarly, if the owners of the commercial component want to make
conduct rules applying only to common washrooms used by their clients,
they would require a special resolution of all the owners in the scheme,
although the residential owners have no interest in the toilets located on the
ﬂoors dedicated to the commercial component. When sectional owners
decide on the budget for the following year, the various interest groups will
normally vote by class and the class with the majority of votes will try to
advance its own ﬁnancial interest as far as possible. Such a clash of interests
* BA LLB (UOFS) BA (Hons) BCL (Oxon) LLD (Unisa).
† BA LLB (Cape Town).
1 Section 32(3)(c) of the Sectional TitlesAct 95 of 1986.
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often results in conﬂict within the community of sectional owners, some of
whom will not take an enthusiastic interest in the management and affairs of
the scheme primarily because they do not have the voting power to protect
their interests.
Mixed-use developments containing commercial and residential space in
the same project are recognized as the most viable utilization of high-density
urban space. Mixed-use development prevents a non-residential city centre
that is densely inhabited during working hours from becoming a desolate
place after the evening rush-hour. By encouraging commercial and
residential use in the same development, a harmonious balance of uses is
achieved which, in turn, produces an attractive and diverse inner city, full of
life during the day and pleasant in the evenings and over the weekends. At
the same time, the application of a mixed-use zoning concept in sectional
title schemes consisting of a more intensiﬁed community of owners often
gives rise to problems. The regulation of the conﬂicting interests of the
various user groups in a sectional title scheme which controls its own limited
space in a more congested environment requires extraordinary patience and
great wisdom — and it is clear that the varied interests of a multiplicity of
user groups in a mixed-use or large sectional title scheme cannot easily be
accommodated by the conventional provisions of the Sectional Titles Act 95
of 1986 with its uniform regulation of both mixed-use and single use
schemes.2 The present statutory governance structure for sectional title
allows only one body corporate to be formed for each sectional title scheme.
However, in a mixed-use development, for example a mixed development
providing shops, ofﬁces and residential accommodation, the interests and the
priorities of the various user groups are likely to be different. Each user group
will normally be more concerned about the management and maintenance
of those parts of the common property which its members use and where the
management decisions directly impact on them. The body corporate may
have difﬁculty in implementing improvements to certain parts of the
common property as the beneﬁts may be perceived to accrue more to a
certain group than to others.3
In view of the problems highlighted above, the question can be asked
whether the best solution for this dilemma is not to designate the common
property within deﬁned components of mixed-use or larger sectional title
schemes which accommodate various interest groups or separate buildings as
limited common property to be used, maintained and governed primarily by the
owners whose sections form part of that component. In what follows we will
2 See also Mark G Baker Condominium Law in Ontario: A Practical Guide (1991) 61;
John B Lundquist ‘Mixed use condominiums under the Minnesota Condominium
Act’ (1984) 10 William Mitchell LR 97 at 98–9 and 101–4.
3 See the speech of the Singapore Minister of National Development on the
second reading of the Building Maintenance and Management Bill para 10: http://
www.mnd.gov.sg/newsroom/speeches/speeches_nd2004_010904.htm (last accessed on 5
December 2008).
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examine how current practice tries to cope with this problem. Then we will
show what methods have been devised in the condominium or apartment
ownership statutes of other countries to attempt to alleviate this problem.
Our ultimate aim is to explore whether the Sectional Titles Act (‘the Act’)
can be amended to include a framework for an extended governance
structure designed to cope with the management problems encountered in
mixed-use and other complex sectional title schemes.
II METHODS USED IN CURRENT PRACTICE
An obvious method to achieve a more equitable distribution of expenses
amongst sectional owners in a mixed scheme is to arrange for class liability
for, and voting on the question of, expenses pertaining to a particular
component of the scheme. The rules would then changed so as to allow, for
example, only the representatives of owners of commercial units to vote on
the budget for repairs and maintenance of common property situated in their
component and to provide that only the commercial owners will be liable for
levies raised on the basis of this budget.4 Apart from the difﬁculty in
formulating such a rule, this is only a partial solution that does not address all
the problems in complicated sectional title schemes.
Another practical mechanism is to utilize the provisions on exclusive use
areas in the Sectional Titles Act to create an exclusive use right to the
common property located in each of the various components of a scheme
(for example, the common areas in each building which forms part of a
multi-building sectional title scheme) and then to assign this right in
undivided shares to the owners of each section located in that component.5
Consequently, the exclusive use right to the common property in that
particular component is shared by the multiple sectional owners within that
component and the expenses related to that component are divided amongst
those owners in accordance with s 37(1)(b) of the Act.6
It is not practical to use the provisions of s 27 of theAct to create ‘genuine’
exclusive-use rights for this purpose, ﬁrst because of the high transaction
4 See also Written Representations on the Building Maintenance and Strata Management
Bill (Paper 28) in the Singapore Report of the Select Committee on the Building
Maintenance andManagement Bill (Bill No 6/2004)App III B1–161.
5 This is apparently allowed in terms of s 27(1)(a) and (b). This provision allows a
developer to delineate a ‘part or parts of the common property’ for a speciﬁc purpose on the
sectional plan and to confer exclusive use rights upon the owners of one or more of
the sections. By virtue of para (b) he may then cede the rights to the exclusive use of
such part or parts to the owner or owners of units in the scheme. The body corporate
is given the same powers of creating exclusive-use rights under s 27(3). Under
s 27(7)(a) persons holding undivided shares with regard to exclusive use areas by one
title deed are allowed to obtain a separate title deedwith regard to such share.
6 By virtue of s 37(1)(b) the body corporate shall require the owner or owners of a
section or sections entitled to the right to the exclusive use of a part or parts of the
common property, whether or not such right is registered or conferred by rules made
under the Sectional TitlesAct 66 of 1971, to make such additional contribution to the
fund as is estimated necessary to defray the costs of rates and taxes, insurance and
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costs associated with the cession of an undivided share in the exclusive-use
rights that would be required each time a unit in the component is
transferred. Secondly, if the unit is sold without the undivided share in the
exclusive-use right, this share of the exclusive-use right will vest in the body
corporate.7 This creates an unacceptable situation. The body corporate,
instead of the new owner, becomes entitled to a share in the use of the
earmarked common-property component and is now presumably saddled
with paying the original holder’s share of the expenses pertaining to the
earmarked common property. The new owner is left suspended with no
apparent right to use the common areas in that particular component of the
scheme. The matter can only be corrected if the body corporate sells and
transfers the undivided share in the earmarked common property to the new
owner of the unit. The provisions of s 27A (creating ‘minor’ exclusive-use
rights) are more suitable for this purpose because the applicable rule can be
drafted so as to confer an undivided share in the exclusive-use rights on the
owner ‘from time to time’ of the sections in the particular component. But
irrespective of how this arrangement is achieved, it is very awkward in itself.
It creates problems in identifying the function for which the common areas
earmarked for exclusive use in a particular component are reserved.
Moreover, most owners do not really understand the nature and conse-
quences of this arrangement. Finally, the arrangement can only be adapted to
changed circumstances by way of a unanimous or special resolution of the
entire body corporate, and therefore the owners who are directly affected by
it must rely on the cooperation of other owners to vary it.
A third mechanism is to utilize the provisions of reg 30(2) made under the
Act.8 This regulation allows a developer on the opening of a sectional title
register to insert a condition in the schedule referred to in s 11(3)(b) of the
Act restricting transfer of a unit without the consent of an association whose
constitution stipulates that all members of the body corporate of the scheme
shall be members of that association and that the functions and powers of that
association shall be assigned to that association. In such a case, reg 30(2)
allows the developer, when submitting an application for the opening of a
sectional title register, to substitute any management rule contained in
Annexure 8. This freedom is then utilized to introduce a two-tier
governance structure for the scheme. Most commonly, an ‘umbrella
management body’ is created which may be a s 21 company or a property
owners’ association formed in terms of planning legislation or under the
common law. This umbrella body typically manages a number of separate
entities, for example a group-housing development and one or more
maintenance in respect of any such part or parts, including the provision of electricity
and water, unless in terms of the rules the owners concerned are responsible for such
costs.
7 Section 27(4).
8 The regulations are contained in GN R664 GG 11245 of 8 April 1988 as
amended.
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sectional-title schemes. The absence of a statutory framework for two-tier
management structures allows developers who choose to follow this route
the freedom to create any form of management structure, and the result is
that diverse models have been applied.
The most prevalent mechanism used for achieving two-tier scheme
governance structures is for the attorneys and land surveyors assisting
developers to manipulate the management and conduct rules of mixed-use
and larger schemes when submitting their applications for the registration of
the sectional plan and the opening of a sectional title register. New rules are
somewhat haphazardly inserted in an attempt to accommodate the special
governance requirements of the different components within these mixed-
use and/or multi-building schemes.
This has proved to be unsatisfactory and indeed unsuccessful. First of all, it
may be questioned whether such a procedure is legal. No management rule
is allowed to conﬂict with the provisions of the Act.9 It is questionable
whether the current single-tier management structure of the Act can be
changed in the prescribed management rules to accommodate two-tier
bodies corporate. But even if that is legally possible, the management of these
schemes has become even more complicated and unwieldy. Developers and
their advisers, although doubtless genuinely intending to create a sound
governance structure, have in many cases not succeeded in providing a
mixed-scheme system that operates efﬁciently, effectively and without
practical problems. The main problem seems to be that there is a lack of
expertise to ensure that the rules are skillfully altered to ensure a workable
and effective governance structure. Often original intentions to include
appropriate management arrangements in the rules are abandoned or ignored
under the pressure to obtain swift registration of sectional plans and transfer
of units. It is also not unusual to encounter complex mixed-use schemes that
have the standard management and conduct rules as prescribed under the
Act. A related problem is that attorneys usually obtain their ﬁnancial reward
for opening a sectional-title register in the form of instructions to transfer
units in the scheme after the register has been opened. They are seldom paid
for their expertise in altering the prescribed management rules to provide for
efﬁcient governance. Consequently, they tend to use whatever precedents
they can lay their hands on to accommodate developers’ instructions without
really paying attention to the suitability of their proposed rules to the
particular project with which they are dealing. In practice there is a
proliferation of sets of special rules that provide for the governance of
multi-use schemes.
9 This is implied by s 35 of theAct, which states that a scheme must be controlled
and managed by rules subject to the statutory provisions regarding the control and
management of the scheme. See C G van der Merwe Sectional Titles, Share Blocks and
Time-sharing vol I Sectional Titles (2007) 13–8(1).
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III COMPARATIVE SOLUTIONS
Comparative research has revealed that certain overseas statutes have
employed the concept of ‘limited common property’ as opposed to ‘general
common property’ to overcome the unfairness of making all the owners pay
for certain repairs, for instance to a lift, roof or staircase that serves only a
distinct part of the scheme. The concept is employed primarily to achieve a
more equitable division of the cost of maintaining a particular limited
common property area by restricting payment of that expense to the actual
users thereof.10 Most of the Anglo-American statutes somewhat confusedly
apply the term ‘limited common property’ to those common areas and
facilities reserved for the use of one or more sectional owners as opposed to
general common property which is open for use by all the sectional
owners.11 American examples of limited common property are special
corridors, stairways, elevators, sanitary services common to apartments of a
particular storey, parking spaces, laundry rooms, porches, patios, balconies
and stairways contiguous to and serving only one or more owners
exclusively.12 Canadian literature mentions the following examples of
limited common elements or exclusive-use common elements: balconies,
patios, parking lots and roof gardens allocated for the exclusive use of one
owner; a high-speed elevator to the penthouse of a high-rise building; a
swimming pool limited to the owners of one building in a multi-building
scheme; and garages and storage lockers in the basement allocated to single
apartments.13
At this stage it is worth noting that the South African statute does not
employ the concept of ‘limited common property’ but has created the
concept of ‘exclusive use areas’ to cover the situation where a speciﬁc part of
the common property is reserved for the particular use of one sectional
owner.14As indicated above, this concept is not readily usable in the situation
where part of a particular common area is reserved for the use of more than
one sectional owner but not for all of them.
Some jurisdictions apply the concept of limited common property in a
more constructive way by applying it only to those parts of the scheme
earmarked for use by more than one, but not by all, the sectional owners.
10 See in general C G van der Merwe ‘Apartment ownership’ in International Ency-
clopaedia of Comparative Law vol VI; Athanassios N Yiannopoulos (ed) Property and
Trust (1994) ss 130–7 at 53–5; James A Rosenstein ‘Inadequacies of current condo-
minium legislation —Acritical look at the Pennsylvania Unit PropertyAct’ (1974) 47
Temple LR 655.
11 For the United States, see Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act
s 1–103(16); for Canada, see s 3(1)(f) of theOntario CondominiumAct of 1980.
12 Patrick J Rohan & Melvin A Reskin Condominium Law and Practice: Forms
(looseleaf, ﬁrst published 1980) no 6–01(5).
13 Anne Warner la Forest Anger & Honsberger Law of Real Property 2 ed (1959) no
3907.4;Alvin Rosenberg Condominium in Canada (looseleaf, ﬁrst published 1969) nos
602 and 702.
14 See ss 27 and 27Aof the Sectional TitlesAct of 1986.
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The cost of maintaining that limited common property or facility is then
distributed amongst the actual users thereof. Thus the Cuban statute provides
that elements destined to serve a limited number of apartments such as special
stairs and elevators, private entrances and bathrooms shared by all apartments
on one ﬂoor, shall be considered limited common elements if all the owners
so agree.15 The Israeli Law of 1969 goes even further and provides the
following: where a sectional title scheme consists of several buildings or
wings, each of which has a separate entrance or separate common
installations, the apartment owners may stipulate in the rules that the
common property or part thereof situated in each structure or wing shall
only be linked to the apartments situated therein.16 The main aim of this
provision is to place the responsibility for maintenance of each building or
wing on the owners concerned.
The most innovative and far-reaching approach to solving the problems of
the maintenance and governance of schemes consisting of various user
groups is the recent Singapore Building Maintenance and Strata Manage-
ment Act of 2004,17 which deals with these matters in strata-title schemes in
Singapore.18 To facilitate the management of mixed-use developments and
certain other large strata-title schemes,19 this Act introduced the option of a
two-tier management corporation system in the place of the existing
single-management corporation. Under the two-tier system the developer is
allowed to set up a main-management corporation and one or more
subsidiary management corporations. This Act employs the concept of
limited common property to identify the parts of the common property used
by speciﬁc user groups20 and provides for different (subsidiary) management
bodies for each limited common-property component.21 Upon an order
15 Article 12 of the Ley de la Propiedad Horizontal of 1952. See also art 8 of the
Venezuelan Ley de Propiedad Horizontal of 1983 and art 4 of the Japanese Law on
CompartedOwnership of Buildings of 1962.
16 Section 59(a) of the Land Law of 1969.
17 Act 47 of 2004. A two-tier management structure was proposed by Lundquist
op cit note 2 at 97 and 104–6 who conceded (at 104n33) that such a structure was not
expressly authorized in the Minnesota Uniform CondominiumAct. See also Donald
E Theriot ‘Louisiana Condominium Act of 1974’ (1975) 35 Louisiana LR 1203 at
1218–19.
18 Until 2004, strata titles in Singapore were regulated by the Land Titles (Strata)
Act of 1988 (revised 1999). In that year the legislator, in the interests of good gover-
nance of strata title schemes, decided to separate the provisions on maintenance and
management from the Land Titles (Strata) Act and to insert these in the Building
Maintenance and Strata ManagementAct 47 of 2004, and to leave matters pertaining
to land (strata) registration in the updated Land Titles (Strata) Act of 1988 (revised
1999).
19 The types of schemes allowed are discussed at IV(4) below. Under s 76(2)-(4) of
the Building Maintenance and Strata Management Act 47 of 2004 the Minister is
allowed to approve further types.
20 Sections 2 and 78 of the Building Maintenance and Strata Management Act of
2004.
21 Section 77.
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issued by the Minister, and subject to a comprehensive resolution22 of the
management corporation ﬁled with the Chief Surveyor, existing strata
schemes can also apply to identify limited common-property components
and set up subsidiary management corporations.23
The two-tier management structure consists of a main management
corporation to take care of the general common property used by all the
owners in the scheme, for instance a common driveway and car park for a
single high-rise building, and a subsidiary body corporate for every limited
common-property component marked out for use by the owners of a certain
interest or user group.24 The rationale is that such a structure will facilitate
the management of mixed-use and large strata developments by allowing the
formation of layered management components, with each component being
managed by a subsidiary management corporation representing the interests
of a speciﬁc user group.
The subsidiary management corporations have the same functions and
duties as the main management corporation in respect of matters which
relate solely to the limited property component concerned25 (with the
exception of powers pertaining to certain general matters such as disposition,
additions to and improvements of the common property, and certain aspects
of insurance and proceedings against sectional owners).26 The Singapore Act
speciﬁcally prohibits a subsidiary management corporation from granting an
owner permission to effect an improvement to his or her section that affects
the appearance or structural integrity of the building or buildings.27 The
subsidiary management corporation for a particular user group will be
responsible for managing the limited common property intended for the
exclusive use of that user group (for example, the swimming pool allocated as
limited common property to the residential group). The subsidiary manage-
22 Under s 2(6) of the Act ‘a motion is decided by comprehensive resolution if (a)
the motion is considered at a duly convened general meeting of such corporation of
which at least 21 days’ notice specifying the motion has been given; and (b) at the end
of a period of 12 weeks after the general meeting in paragraph (a) is convened, on a
poll, the total share value of the lots for which valid votes are counted for the motion
is at least 90% of the aggregate share value of the lots of all the subsidiary proprietors
who, at the end of the period, constitute the management or subsidiary management
corporation, as the case may be’.
23 Section 78(1)(b)
24 Section 79(1).
25 See s 79(4).
26 Section 79(3). According to Singapore Building and Construction Authority
Strata Living in Singapore — A General Guide (2005) 35, the exceptions include execut-
ing a transfer of part of the common property; accepting a grant or transfer of any land
or section; amalgamating or making additions to the common property; executing,
accepting or surrendering a grant of easement or restrictive condition; allowing
improvements or additions to sections which may impair the appearance or structural
integrity of the building or buildings; maintaining the strata roll and insuring every
building in the scheme; and taking care of structural defects in the scheme.
27 Section 79(3).
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ment corporation will have the power to establish its own management and
sinking fund for administrative expenses; levy contributions for the
maintenance of and improvement to the common property; enforce by-laws
relating to its limited common property; and otherwise have the control,
management and administration of its limited common property.28 This is
intended to result in more equitable sharing of maintenance contributions in
mixed-use schemes. It is also aimed at solving the problem where one group
of sectional owners may block any proposed upgrading works that will
primarily serve another user group of sectional owners in the same scheme.
The Singapore Act further provides for the subsidiary management
corporations to elect an executive committee and to hold general meetings
and pass resolutions in the same way as the main management corporation.29
It requires that at least two members of the executive committee of each
subsidiary corporation shall be members of the main management executive
committee.30 It further provides a formula for the allocation of the expenses
of the subsidiary management corporation amongst its members31 and
empowers the subsidiary management corporation to make binding by-laws
relating to its limited common property.32 Judgments against the manage-
ment corporation that relate solely to units controlled by the subsidiary
management corporation are effective against only the owners of those
units.33 Originally the provisions applied solely to new developments, but it
is envisaged that older schemes will be allowed to convert to this new system
once experience is gained (and if it is authorized by the Minister and a
comprehensive resolution34 of the management corporation).35
The purpose of and motivation for the introduction of a two-tier
governance structure in Singapore are summarized in the following words of





32 Section 82(2) and (3).
33 Section 83.
34 Under s 2(6) a motion is decided by ‘comprehensive resolution’ if the motion is
considered at a general meeting of which at least 21 days’ notice has been given and
approved twelve weeks after the general meeting on a vote by poll of 90 per cent of
the value of the votes of themembers of the body corporate.
35 See the Minister’s speech op cit note 3 para 15. Paragraph 6.4.5 of the paper
cited above in note 4 urges the Minister to set a period of one or two years after
implementation for such conversions by the management corporation. See on this
Act in general Building Maintenance and Strata Management Bill (issued by the ﬁrm
Alban Tay Mahtani & de Silva LLP) available at http://64.233.183.104/search?q=
cache:BOG2PSxElF8J: www.atmdlaw. com.sg/mediacentre/pdfs/0205_bldgmaint.pdf+
Building+Maintenance+and+strata+Management+Bill&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=59&gl=za
(last accessed on 5 December 2008); Singapore Building and ConstructionAuthority
op cit note 26 at 33–5. See also the publication cited in note 4 (Paper 26 paras
6.2–6.4).
36 Minister’s speech op cit note 3 para 14.
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‘Sir, the intention is neither to create segregations within a community nor to
encourage the proliferation of MCs. The spirit behind this provision is to allow
for ﬂexible management of strata developments, with clear differentiation in
the interests of various user groups, and clear physical delineation of common
properties.’
IV APPLICATION OF THE SINGAPORE TWO-TIER MANAGE-
MENT STRUCTURE TO SOUTH AFRICA
1. Introduction
One reason for using the Singapore two-tier management structure as a
model for introducing a new governance structure into the South African
Sectional Titles Act is that the parentage of both the South African and
Singapore statutes is the same: in both instances the statutes that preceded
them had been modelled on the more sophisticated New South Wales
Conveyancing (Strata Titles) Act of 1961.37 If one allows for the unique use
of terminology in the two statutes, many of their provisions are identical.
However, before considering which provisions can be transplanted, a few
preliminary questions must be answered.
2. Why make provision in the Act and not in regulations or the management rules?
The most important preliminary question is whether a new governance
structure for complicated sectional title schemes should be catered for in the
Act rather than in special management rules introduced by the developer
when registering the sectional plan or in the regulations under the Act.38 It
has been suggested that an opportunity could be created for developers to
introduce a two-tier governance structure by an amendment of the
regulations promulgated under the Act. The regulations could, for instance,
be amended by the addition of a subregulation under reg 30 providing as
follows:
‘(3A) If the schedule referred to in section 11(3)(b) of the Act contains a
condition allowing the developer to create a two-tier management structure
for that particular development, the developer may, when submitting an
application for the opening of a sectional title register, make rules which cater
for such a structure and for this purpose substitute any management rule
contained in Annexure 8.’
This will give developers of large or multi-use schemes the option of
making their own rules to provide for a two-tier management structure that
suits that particular scheme. But this solution suffers from the same
shortcomings as are apparent in current practice. First, it is optional and not
37 This Act was amended frequently and ﬁnally split into two Acts, namely the
Strata Schemes (Freehold Development) Act 1973, dealing primarily with registra-
tion matters, and the Strata Schemes Management Act 1996, dealing primarily with
governance matters pertaining to strata title schemes. The same division took place in
Singapore: see note 18.
38 GNR664 GG 11245 of 8April 1988 as amended.
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mandatory, which means that only developers who have the necessary
professional assistance would take the trouble to introduce the new structure
for their schemes. Secondly, since no model exists, this would lead to a
proliferation of different two-tier structures in practice, while uniformity is
obviously desirable.
We have already mentioned that the existing practice of developers
assisted by professional advisers introducing a new governance structure for
especially mixed-use schemes in special management rules when registering
the sectional plan might offend against the principle that nothing in the
management rules of a scheme is allowed to conﬂict with the provisions of
the Act.39 Since the Act provides only for a single management structure, it
could be argued that catering for two-tier structures in special rules would be
ultra vires. Furthermore, past experience has shown that attempts to rectify
lacunae in the Act by the introduction of special rules have been awkward,
have not worked very efﬁciently in practice, and have soon been superseded
by detailed regulatory provisions in an amended Sectional Titles Act.
An obvious example is the way in which the concept of exclusive-use
areas was introduced into the sectional title industry. The Sectional Titles Act
of 1971 did not make provision for the establishment of exclusive-use areas.
When the practical necessity for the establishment of these areas arose, it was
initially catered for either by the registration of so-called garden servitudes or
by speciﬁc provision in the rules of a particular scheme.40 These methods
soon proved too expensive or unwieldy, and the scant regulation of the
institution of exclusive-use rules led to malpractices by developers at the
expense of sectional owners and the disruption of the harmony in sectional
title schemes.41 Consequently, the legislator stepped in and regulated the
creation and operation of exclusive use areas extensively in the provisions of
the Act.42
The same happened with the institution of phased developments. Since
the reservation of development rights was not catered for in the 1971
Sectional Titles Act, the Chief Registrar issued draft conditions to enable
developers to reserve for themselves the right to develop a sectional title
scheme in phases by the insertion of these conditions in the annexure to the
ﬁrst sheet of the sectional plan prepared by a conveyancer.43 This awkward
way of reserving a right to develop a scheme in phases was soon superseded
39 See under heading II above.
40 See C G Van der Merwe & D W Butler Sectional Titles, Share Blocks and Time-
sharing (1985) 177–80; Hanri Mostert ‘The regulation of exclusive use areas in terms
of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986: An evaluation of the existing position and
suggested alternatives’ 1997 Stellenbosch LR 324 at 325–6. Other mechanisms such as
notarial leases and servitudes were used in addition to establish these areas.
41 For malpractices by developers with regard to exclusive use areas created in the
rules of the scheme, seeVan derMerwe op cit note 9 at 11–15-11–16.
42 See now ss 27 and 27Aof theAct.
43 SeeVan derMerwe&Butler op cit note 40 at 201–6.
TWO-TIER GOVERNANCE FOR MIXED-USE AND LARGE-SCALE STS 583
by a detailed provision in the 1986 Sectional Titles Act to cater extensively
for development in phases.44
Apart from the fact that it would be even more difﬁcult for developers and
their advisers to ﬁt special rules into the management rules which they are
allowed to amend,45 such a mechanism would not create absolute certainty
since those rules could be amended again by unanimous resolution. In the
ﬁnal analysis, a proliferation of various governance structures as is currently
occurring in practice militates against the principle of uniformity, which is
important for regulating the sectional title industry.We therefore suggest that
an amendment of the Act to provide a uniform framework for a two-tier
management structure for complicated sectional title schemes is the only way
forward. In our view a uniform set of statutory provisions providing a
skeleton for such governance, would be preferable and is necessary to create
order and to avoid unnecessary confusion.
3. What happens to existing schemes with adaptation of the governance structure in
their rules?
We have indicated that at present many sectional title schemes contain
special management arrangements in the management rules inserted by the
developer when registering the sectional plan of the scheme. A question that
arises is this: How can the existing rights and obligations under these special
rules be protected, and how long should the existing arrangements be
allowed to continue before being converted to the ‘ideal’ position as
embodied in the proposed amendment of the Act? In order to create
uniformity and good governance in the sectional title industry, we are of the
opinion that existing governance arrangements in special rules under both
the Sectional TitlesAct of 1971 and that of 1986 should lapse on the expiry of
a period of four years from the date of commencement of the proposed
Amendment Act introducing the new system or on the expiry of such
extended period as the Minister may prescribe by regulation. During this
period the bodies corporate of these schemes would have the opportunity to
convert to the two-tier management system if the stipulated conditions were
met.
In addition, it is proposed that bodies corporate in mixed or large schemes
that qualify for conversion to a two-tier governance system, and which have
not introduced a new governance system in special rules, should be given the
option to convert if authorized by a special resolution of their members.46
The conversion would involve the body corporate, authorized by a special
resolution, applying for the approval of an amending sectional plan
delineating the areas of limited common property and then applying to the
44 See now s 25 of theAct.
45 Note that reg 30(1) prescribes that most of the management rules may not be
amended by the developer when submitting the sectional plan for registration.
46 Cf s 78(1)(a)(ii) of the the Singapore Building Maintenance and Strata Manage-
mentAct of 2004, which requires a ‘comprehensive resolution’.
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Registrar for the registration of that plan at the deeds registry. Upon
registration of the application, the Registrar would issue certiﬁcates of
establishment for the subsidiary bodies corporate.47
4. Types of schemes that may be included
In order to decide which type of scheme would be suitable for two-tier
management, one would have to look at the design of the building or
buildings in the scheme, the type of user groups accommodated in the
scheme and the type of common property comprised in the scheme. The
following guidelines can be used to determine the suitability of a particular
sectional title scheme for two-tier governance:48
(i) The layout and physical boundaries of the general and limited common
property must be distinctly and clearly identiﬁable and capable of being
marked and described on the sectional plan in order to avoid disputes
between the main body corporate and the subsidiary bodies corporate
and between subsidiary bodies corporate;
(ii) each limited common-property component should be capable of being
used primarily by the sectional owners living in that component and
managed by one subsidiary body corporate only, without management
being shared by two or more bodies corporate;
(iii) to facilitate primary use and management by subsidiary bodies
corporate, the limited common property should not include physically
distinct non-adjoining parts of the common property;
(iv) the limited common-property component marked out must be
sufﬁciently large to be managed meaningfully by a subsidiary body
corporate; and
(v) there must be sufﬁcient sectional title units in each limited common-
property component to ensure that there will be a sufﬁcient number of
owners to serve as trustees and a critical mass of limited common
property to give subordinate bodies corporate economies of scale to
collect sufﬁcient funds for maintenance.
Under the Singapore Building Maintenance and Strata Management Act
the types of schemes catered for include mixed-use schemes as well as
residential schemes with different types of residential units, namely:49
(i) Schemes containing residential and non-residential units 50 (for
example, apartments and commercial units or a mix of an hotel and
residential units);
(ii) schemes containing non-residential units used for different purposes51
(for example, as ofﬁces and retail shops);
47 Cf para 2(A)(ii) of the Singapore LandAuthority Practice Circular 2 of 2005.
48 These guidelines were culled from Singapore Building and Construction
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(iii) non-residential units used for the same purpose in physically detached
blocks52 (for example, different ofﬁce tower blocks53 in the same
scheme);
(iv) different types of residential units which comply with the criteria
prescribed by regulation54 (for example, a high-rise tower block and a
low-rise walk-up block or town houses or different wings of a low-rise
building).55
It is proposed that basically the same types of schemes should qualify for
two-tier management under the amended Sectional Titles Act, namely
schemes consisting of:
(i) Residential and non-residential units;
(ii) residential or non-residential units used for different purposes; and
(iii) residential and non-residential units used for the same purpose but
situated in physically distinct locations.
The second instance would cater also for a separate management tier for each
commercial component in a commercial sectional title scheme. The third
instance would cover schemes consisting of a residential tower block and a
lateral residential development.
To obtain the critical mass it is further suggested that the total size of the
sections in the scheme should be equal to or exceed 5 000m2 and that a
maximum number of ﬁve subordinate bodies corporate should be allowed
for one scheme.56
5. Should only the developer be able to introduce the two-tier management
arrangement or should the body corporate also be able to do it later?
We have to consider whether the amended Act should make provision for
the introduction of the two-tier management arrangement, not only by
developers for new schemes qualifying for such structure, but also by the
52 Section 77(1)(b)(ii). This is subject to the proviso that the two-tier system will
not adversely affect the use and enjoyment of units in the other limited property
components and the conditions prescribed by regulation for this purpose. Regulation
18(b) of the Building Maintenance (Strata Management) Regulations 2005 prescribes
that the total ﬂoor area of all the units whose owners constitute each subsidiary
management corporation to be formed is at least 5 000m2. This was proposed by the
Real Estate Developer’sAssociation of Singapore in op cit note 4 (Paper 20).
53 See especially the publication cited in note 4 (Paper 26 para 6.4.1.1 and Paper 45
para 2.2.2).
54 Section 77(1)(c) read with s 77(2). Regulation 19 deﬁnes different types of resi-
dential units as units comprised in the following buildings in the same scheme: an
apartment block with a lift, an apartment block without a lift and a townhouse, a
semi-detached house, a detached house or a terrace.
55 This example is given in the Minister’s speech op cit note 3 para 13. His motiva-
tion is that this would address the usual complaint that certain common properties
serve only a particular group of residents, eg lifts in high-rise blocks.
56 The minimum of 5 000m2 for a limited common-property area was also sug-
gested byReal Estate Developers’Association of Singapore op cit note 4 (Paper 20).
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bodies corporate of existing schemes qualifying for it. In our view, the
developer of new schemes should be compelled to introduce the proposed
new governance structure on registration of the sectional plan and the
opening of the sectional title register. In addition, the bodies corporate of
existing schemes qualifying for a two-tier management structure should also
be entitled to make the provisions of the Act applicable to their particular
scheme — although it would need to be considered what measure of
authorization by sectional owners must precede the introduction of a
two-tiered structure. Should the written consent of all sectional owners be
required for such introduction or would a unanimous or even a special
resolution sufﬁce?57 In our opinion the body corporate should need a special
resolution to proceed, but any owner who is of the opinion that the
delineation or allocation is unfairly prejudicial to his ownership rights
should, within 30 days after the resolution was adopted, have the
opportunity to apply to the High Court for relief.
6. Creation of special category of limited common property
In order to provide a more sophisticated governance structure for compli-
cated sectional title schemes, it is our view that it is essential that the Act
should also be amended to introduce a new category of common property,
namely ‘limited common property’, in addition to the existing category of
‘exclusive use areas’. ‘Limited common property’ should then be deﬁned as
common property used by more than one of the owners but not by all of
them. One would then have to distinguish between ‘general common
property’, ‘limited common property’ and ‘exclusive-use areas’.
In order to create certainty and clarity we suggest that the limited
common-property component of a sectional title scheme should be clearly
demarcated on the sectional plan rather than on a scale plan as is allowed for
the creation of exclusive-use areas in terms of the management or conduct
rules under the Act.58 The layout, boundaries and other physical aspects of
each limited common-property area must be distinctly and clearly identiﬁ-
able, as well as capable of being marked and described on the sectional plan.
This would necessitate an amendment of the provisions of the Act and the
regulations dealing with sectional plans.
57 Section 53(1) of the British Columbia Condominium Act of 1979 requires a
special resolution for the creation of new limited common areas.Most statutes require
an amendment of the project documents to accommodate new areas of limited com-
mon property. This usually necessitates a unanimous resolution, but more lenient
provisions are also found in, for example, s 5(6) of the Condominium Act of Mani-
toba of 1979, which requires an 80 per cent majority. Cf s 78(1)(a)(ii) of the Singapore
Building Maintenance and Strata Management Act of 2004, which requires a ‘com-
prehensive resolution’ (for which see note 34 above).
58 Section 27A.
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7. Creation of main body corporate and subsidiary bodies corporate to govern
particular limited common-property areas
Once limited common-property areas have been clearly demarcated on a
registered sectional plan, we suggest that separate subsidiary bodies corporate
should automatically be created for the management and administration of
the different limited common-property components of the scheme and that
these special management structures should be linked with the main
management structure administering the ‘general common property’.
Consequently, a subsidiary management body would be responsible for
administering the interests of the owners entitled to the use and enjoyment
of a speciﬁc limited common-property area, while the main management
structure would be responsible for administering the interests of all the
sectional owners in respect of the general common property. The subsidiary
body corporate should have the same powers and functions as the main body
corporate with regard to any matter which relates solely to the limited
common property, except perhaps for certain important matters such as the
power of alienation, improvement and addition to the common property,
and the provisions relating to insurance and proceedings against sectional
owners.
8. Relationship between the main body corporate and the subsidiary bodies corporate
The main body corporate consisting of all the sectional owners would
maintain, govern and control the general common property, whereas the
subsidiary bodies corporate consisting of the owners of sections in a
particular limited common-property area would maintain, manage and
control that speciﬁc limited property area. To promote liaison in governance
functions between the main and subsidiary bodies corporate, it is suggested
that at least two of the trustees of each subsidiary body corporate should be
elected to serve as trustees on the main body corporate. A division between
‘common’ expenses payable by all owners in the scheme and ‘shared’
expenses payable by the owners entitled to an area of limited common
property has to be worked out. We suggest that the way in which expenses
regarding exclusive use areas are dealt with might, with certain qualiﬁca-
tions, be a good model for allocating the expenses arising in limited common
areas.
9. Management and conduct rules
It is proposed that the prescribed management and conduct rules would
apply equally to the main and subsidiary bodies corporate, but that the
various subsidiary bodies corporate should be given the power to make
additional conduct rules applicable to their limited common-property area
only.
V SUMMARY OF SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS TO THE
SECTIONAL TITLES ACT
The Act should allow the creation (establishment) of subsidiary bodies
corporate within the main body corporate where each subsidiary body
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corporate will represent the interests of a user group or physical component
(eg residential, ofﬁce or shop) that comprises a distinct group of sectional
owners having a common interest.
Developers or bodies corporate adopting the two-tier system must:
(i) delineate the limited common property clearly on the draft sectional
plan;
(ii) apply for approval of the draft sectional plan by the Surveyor-General;
and
(iii) apply for the registration of sectional plan by the Registrar and the issue
of certiﬁcates of establishment of subsidiary bodies corporate.
Conveyancers acting for developers of new schemes and the body corporate
for existing schemes must use speciﬁc forms in their application for the
registration of the sectional plan containing a limited common-property
component and the registration of this plan in the sectional-title register. In
this form conveyancers must state the number of subsidiary bodies corporate,
the respective sectional title units comprising each subsidiary body corporate,
the numbers of the subsidiary bodies corporate (for example, subordinate
body corporate no 1 and subordinate body corporate no 2) and their
addresses for service. Upon registration the Registrar will issue the
certiﬁcates of establishment for the main body corporate as well as for the
subsidiary bodies corporate.59
The subsidiary bodies corporate will then have the same powers and
functions with regard to the limited common area allocated to them as the
main body corporate. It has to manage the area for the exclusive beneﬁt of its
members. The subsidiary body corporate will elect its own trustees and
conduct its own general meeting; it will have its own budget and
management and reserve fund, and allocate its own expenses and service
charges amongst its members proportionate to individual participation
quotas; it will control its own utilities and facilities and create and operate its
own exclusive use areas. Finally, it will be entitled to make special conduct
rules tailored to the needs of the particular limited common-property
component.
The main body corporate will have the same functions and powers with
regard to the general common property and certain maters reserved for its
governance. It will consist of all the sectional owners. In order to safeguard
the interests of the various subsidiary bodies corporate included in the
scheme, at least two trustees of every subsidiary body corporate must also be
a trustee of the main body corporate.60
59 Cf para 2(A)(1) of the Singapore LandAuthority Practice Circular 2 of 2005.
60 Provision should also be made for the merger of subsidiary bodies corporate
allowing subsidiary bodies corporate to amalgamate their respective limited common
properties to constitute a single subsidiary body corporate for the amalgamated lim-
ited common property. Conveyancers should use a speciﬁc application form for this.
The Registrar will issue a certiﬁcate of establishment of a subsidiary body corporate
upon registration of the application. Provision should also be made for the dissolution
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VI CONCLUSION
There are many advantages to allowing mixed-use and larger sectional title
schemes to have a two-tier management structure with subsidiary bodies
corporate managing different areas of the scheme designated as limited
common property. First, it would result in a fairer distribution of expenses
for the maintenance and repair of parts and facilities situated in a particular
area. In a mixed-use scheme consisting of a hotel, ofﬁces and a residential
component, there is no reason why all the owners should be responsible for
the upkeep of the lifts and the cleaning of internal passages that serve only
one limited property component. Secondly, a two-tier governance system
will facilitate the management of a mixed-use or large sectional title scheme
by allowing the formation of layered management organs within such
schemes, with each limited common-property area being managed by a
subsidiary body corporate representing the interests of the speciﬁc user group
of that area. It will, for instance, solve the problem in one-tier schemes
where one user group may block any proposed upgrading works that will
primarily serve the interests of another group of sectional owners. It will also
facilitate the overall management of the scheme and the budgeting for
expenses for the maintenance of that particular limited common area.
Thirdly, sectional owners of a speciﬁc limited common-property area will be
more enthusiastic and prepared to participate in the management of the
scheme, especially in the affairs of the subsidiary body corporate designated
to manage that part of the common property and facilities which directly
affect them. Fourthly, it will reduce conﬂicts encountered in single-tier
schemes because the scope of commonality will be restricted to the general
common property. Fifthly, the fact that subsidiary bodies corporate would be
entitled to make their own rules for their own areas would mean that the
model conduct rules designed for residential sections and ‘quiet businesses’ of
the 1970s could be adapted to meet the needs of that particular component.
Many of the special rules inserted by the developer in mixed-use schemes do
not deal with the real issues but in fact entrench various developer rights,
cater for the convenient exit of the developer from the scheme, and leave the
scheme with a set of inappropriate rules. Finally, the better management of
mixed-use and large sectional-title schemes will enhance the attractiveness of
such schemes to all owner residents and investors, including foreigners and
institutions.61
The main criticism against the introduction of a two-tier governance
system for sectional titles is that the additional management structures will be
costly. A managing agent would probably have to be appointed for every
of a subsidiary body corporate and the re-designation as common property of its
limited common property if both the main body corporate and the subsidiary bodies
corporate resolve to dissolve the subsidiary body corporate. A new application form
must then be lodgedwith theRegistrar for registration.
61 See in general the publication cited in note 4 (Papers 4, 20, 26 para 6.4, 27 and
45 para 2).
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL590
subsidiary body corporate as well as for the main body corporate; if the same
agent is appointed, he would have to attend twice as many meetings. The
managing agent or agents will have to handle three times the paperwork.
There will also be three sets of accounts and the management cost of the
scheme will increase substantially. Furthermore, management and mainte-
nance expenses for each limited common-property area will have to be
separately accounted for. It may not always be practical or cost-effective for
the subsidiary body corporate to engage a separate set of contractors just to
manage and maintain the limited common property. Moreover, a two-tier
governance structure will probably require at least three separate bodies
corporate, many more volunteers to act as trustees, and at least three general
meetings per year instead of one. These concerns could be countered by the
argument that owners would be prepared to spend money on administrative
services to avoid inequitable cross-subsidization of expenses and would be
more willing to serve as trustees and to attend a general meeting if their
interests were affected directly. Again, accurately delineating the boundaries
of some types of limited common property, for example central air-
conditioning for the shops, is going to be an uphill task. Even if the limited
common property can be delineated on the plans, the situation on the
ground is often not clear. Disputes are bound to arise over maintenance
responsibilities, access rights, and in regard to where the limited common
property starts and ends. However, it is clear that disputes between various
interest groups in the once single-tier governance system will decrease
markedly once a two-tier system is introduced and understood. Finally, in
order to avoid problems with the election of trustees and budget proposals at
the general meeting of the main body corporate, the election of trustees and
times for holding the general meetings of subsidiary bodies corporate could
be synchronized with the timing of and the budgeting at the general meeting
of the main body corporate. This might involve appointing the same
accounting ofﬁcers for both the meetings.62
62 Ibid, Paper 23 para 16.2, Paper 26 paras 6.2 and 6.4.2 and Papers 3, 28, 44 and
45.
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